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11 Aug, 2024 22:15
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Fyodor Lukyanov: Could Iran and Israel drift into a full-scale war?
The two rivals’ jabs at each other are rapidly increasing in both number and intensity
Fyodor Lukyanov
By Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor-in-chief of Russia in Global Affairs, chairman of the Presidium of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, and research director of the Valdai International Discussion Club.
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Fyodor Lukyanov: Could Iran and Israel drift into a full-scale war?
Four Israeli soldiers stand behind razor wire near the Palestinian village of Bil'in in the West Bank © Getty Images / Getty Images
The situation in the Middle East, where the aspirations of Iran and Israel have once again collided, is paradoxical in that there is no way out. Both sides would like to put a stop to the other’s gallop, but this is impossible without disastrous consequences for themselves. There are many reasons for this situation, including the geographical compactness of the region, where any action echoes loudly and boomerangs erratically. More importantly, all the problems and relationships are so intertwined that to untangle them would require a colossal effort that no one is capable of. Theoretically, the cord could be cut with a powerful game-changing blow, but nobody has the wherewithal.
This last statement may seem a bit controversial. Israel is pursuing an extremely aggressive policy of reshaping its entire security landscape, hoping to contain the surrounding threats for a long time to come. Iran, on the other hand, is generally seen as an actively revisionist power, managing the regional landscape sometimes directly, but especially through the use of partner groups (a sort of ‘Axis of Resistance’) in various countries. The assumption that a decisive battle is likely should be supported by the fact that the entire region is already in turmoil and external powers, including the traditionally dominant US, are merely feigning active involvement rather than knowing exactly what they want. Thus, it’s surely high time for the plucky and the determined to make the leap to a new status. But what new status?
Historically, there have been successive dominant powers in this part of the world, mostly colonial masters from the West over the past few centuries. Now, for various reasons (mostly their own internal), these powers have withdrawn, perhaps permanently. This is the time for local players to assert their right to dominance, especially since some of them have the relevant traditions (Iran, Turkey), others have the military potential (Israel), and another has a lot of money and control over important religious shrines (Saudi Arabia).
In earlier times, the struggle for influence would have been fierce, and of course there is still competition today. Iran, in particular, is widely suspected of trying to dominate the entire Middle East with its religious and political influence (through Shia communities and friendly political organizations). Turkey periodically juggles with the notion of ‘neo-Ottomanism’, though it carefully avoids it. But the idea of controlling security zones beyond its own borders has been implemented for decades.
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However, the various forms of expansion have long since ceased to be about conquering space for the sake of territorial expansion. The aim is the same: to secure a more favorable situation in terms of strategic depth, i.e. the ability to protect itself more reliably from external threats and thereby strengthen domestic security.
This is a widespread phenomenon. Some countries are blessed because they have no troublesome neighbors (Australia or the North American states come to mind, although in the latter case the US can point to Mexico and migration.) But these are very rare exceptions; in most cases such problems have to be faced. Enlargement of borders used to be the norm, now it is the exception – it is unstable (because it is impossible to legitimize) and costly. Buffer zones are more common and we see them all the time. But this method is obviously situational.
Finally, there is the option of influencing the internal affairs of a neighbor to deter it from acting unilaterally. This is probably the most common form of deterrence today. More precisely, it’s desirable because it does not involve major hostilities and the risks associated with them. It doesn’t always work, however.
Coming back to the Iran-Israel axis, both sides are aware of the impossibility of achieving their desired goals through a full-on direct clash. Hence, the constant brinkmanship, including extremely provocative steps, in the expectation that the response will not cross any red line. This has worked so far, although the density and intensity of the mutual jabs is rapidly increasing. In such a format of interaction, it is impossible to leave anything without a reaction, and sooner or later it may turn out that the relatively restrained forms of response have come to an end.
Another problem is the ability of adversaries to anticipate the immediate consequences of their moves. It is believed that the Middle East is home to grandmasters in this field, masters of this high stakes game. But global experience shows that the level of geopolitical mastery is generally declining, perhaps because of dramatically changing contingencies. There is no reason to believe that the various actors are still capable of playing games of real strategic depth, while managing to avoid falling into a shallow tactical pool. " |
